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ABSTRACT 
Two nonstandard modes of mference, conftrmatton and dental, have been shown 
by Bandler and Kohout to be vahd m fuzzy propositional and predicate logics. I f  
demal ts used m combmatton with modus ponens, the resultmg mference mode 
("augmented modus ponens") ytelds more prectse bounds on the consequent ofan 
implication than are usually called for m approximate r asoning. Slmdar results 
hold for augmented modus tollens constructed from conftrmatton and conventtonal 
fuzzy modus tollens 
Two simpler modes of mference, presumption and prejudtce, are also vahd under 
the same assumptions as conftrmatton and dental PreJudice tmposes an upper 
bound on the truth value of the consequent ofa fuzzy tmphcatton regardless of the 
truth value of the antecedent; presumption imposes a lower bound on the truth value 
of the antecedent regardless of that of the consequent. Some of the consequences of
presumptton and prejudzce cast doubt on the suttabthty o f fuzzy propostttonal nd 
predtcate logtcs for use m expert systems that are destgned to process real-world 
data. 
A logic based dtrectly on fuzzy sets is explored as an alternative. Fuzzy set logic 
supports fuzzy modus ponens and modus tollens but does not entad the more 
problematic modes of confirmation, demal, presumptton, and prejudwe However, 
some of the expressive power derivable from the dtverstty of fuzzy proposttzonal 
logws and thetr dertvattve fuzzy predicate logics ts lost. 
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INTRODUCTION 
An elementary logical statement 1s the basic unit of any logic system, in the 
sense that it is the smallest logical unit to which a truth value can be assigned 
within the system One of the most fundamental ways of dividing the general 
field of logic is by the way statements are analyzed In propositional logic, 
elementary statements are treated as unanalyzed units; in predicate logic, an 
elementary statement asserts that a particular object has a particular attribute or 
that a particular set of objects tand in a particular relation to one another; and in 
set logic, an elementary statement asserts that an object belongs to a particular 
set. 
In the following section we discuss propositional logic, considering both the 
traditional binary truth value systems and multlvalent fuzzy systems. The latter 
discussion concentrates on multivalent logical operations that follow the axioms 
of continuous triangular norms (T-norms) and their dual triangular conorms 
(Schwelzer and Sklar [1, 2]) Drawing upon recent work on the nonstandard 
inference modes of confirmation and denial (Bandler and Kohout [3], Hall [4], 
Schwartz [5]), we derive "augmented" versions of modus ponens and modus 
tollens for multlvalent logic, using the method of "residuation" (Trillas and 
Valverde [6]) to derive both an upper bound and a lower bound for the inferred 
truth value; these bounds often coincide, yielding a unique answer Two 
additional modes of inference, presumption and prejudice, are derived using the 
same techniques; these modes entail a lower bound on the truth of the antecedent 
and an upper bound on the truth of the consequent from knowledge of the truth 
of the implication alone 
The third section presents a parallel development of similar results for the case 
of predicate logic It concludes with a simple demonstration f "knowledge base 
psychosis," in which multiple rules of fuzzy predicate logic interact o preclude 
the denial of any base value of the antecedent variable due to presumption, and to 
preclude the affirmation of any base value of the consequent variable due to 
prejudice 
In the fourth section we consider inferences derived from a more fundamental 
grounding in set logic We consider a single primary universe of discourse 
consisting of objects that are classified into fuzzy subsets on the basis of the 
values of several attributes; an inference rule in this sytem consists of the 
assertion that all objects belong to a consequent fuzzy subset C at least as 
strongly as they belong to an antecedent fuzzy subset A. In this environment, 
ordinary fuzzy modus ponens and modus tollens are well-defined according to 
the "standard strict" lmphcatlon operator and the compositional rule of 
inference, but confirmation, denial, presumption, and prejudice are not 
derivable. Thus, no a priori constraints are placed on the antecedent or the 
consequent 
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We next illustrate these results with a simple example based on the fuzzy 
relation between fast driving and poor fuel economy. We conclude with a 
summary of the implications of these results and an outline of future research 
involving the concept of "usuahty" in fuzzy set logic 
PROPOSIT IONAL LOGIC 
An implication rule in propositional logic takes the simple form "i f  
(antecedent) then (consequent)," or " I f  A then C"  for short In standard two- 
valued logic, the only way that this lmphcatlon can be judged false is if A is true 
while C is false; thus, the implication is held to be true if C is true or if A is 
false In other words, the truth or falsity of the statement " I f  A then C"  is 
identical to the truth or falsity of the statement "C  or Not A " Many theoretical 
treatments of material implication in multivalent propositional logic preserve 
this equivalence; in such a logic the degree of truth attached to " I f  A then C"  
can be computed by finding the truth value of "C  or Not A " Different systems 
of multlvalent logic arise from the choice of a truth function to represent "or"  
and to a lesser extent from the representation f "Not " The most important 
class of such systems IS the class of S-lmphcations, in which the "or"  operator 
is defined by a T-conorm (Schwelzer and Sklar [1, 2], Bonissone [7]), the most 
important S-imphcatlons are Kleene-Dienes, probabihstic and Lukasiewlcz. 
Other systems of multivalent logic make a distinction between " I f  A then C"  
and "C  or Not A , "  but every propositional tmphcation operator ~ defines a 
truth value Tr(A ~ C) = I[Tr(A), Tr(C)] that varies directly with Tr(C) (the 
truth of C) and inversely with Tr(A ) (the truth of A ). 1 The most important class 
of logics that do not postulate an identity between " I f  A then C"  or "C  or Not 
A"  is the class of R-implications, which define the modus ponens operation in 
terms of a T-norm and derive the lmphcation operator to fit; the most important 
R-imphcatlons are Brouwer (also known as "standard star"), quotient, and 
Lukaslewicz. (Note that the Lukaslewicz logic satisfies the definitions of both S- 
lmphcation and R-implication, this versatihty is surely not unrelated to the 
popularity of the logic.) 
Several authors have performed more or less empirical comparisons among 
operators gleaned from the literature, with conflicting results depending on 
which particular eal or simulated omain of application was used (Mizumoto 
[8, 9], Whalen and Schott [10]). On the theoretical side, other researchers start 
with a particular set of assumptions and infer an lmphcatlon operator that suits 
them (Sanchez [11], Smets and Magrez [12,13]). The safest overall conclusion 
The only major exception is Mamdam's operator, which is not a material ~mphcauon operator 
("If-then") but rather a conjunctaon perator ("and") Inference mMamdam's system is more 
properly treated as a generalized alternatwe syllogism than as generahzed modus ponens 
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from these studies ~s that different situations appear to require different 
implication operators. 
Modus ponens allows us to infer a lower bound for Tr(C), the truth value of 
the consequent, from the truth value of the imphcation Tr(A --, C) and the truth 
value of the antecedent Tr(A); this lower bound is equal to the truth value of "A 
and (ff A then C) , "  where "and"  is defined by the modus ponens generating 
function mp (Tnllas and Valverde [6]) proper to the implication operator I that is 
used to define " i f  then" 
where 
Tr(C)_mp[Tr(A) ,  Tr(A --, C)] 
mp(x, t )=mf{y:  I(x, y)>_t} 
If the antecedent and the lmphcatlon are both totally true [Tr(A) = Tr(A ~ C) 
= I], then the lower bound on the truth value of the consequent Is 1, or "true,"  
since mp(1, 1) = 1 under any modus ponens generating function mp. One is also 
the universal upper bound of truth values, so in this case the truth value of the 
consequent Is completely determined as "true " On the other hand, if the 
antecedent is totally false (truth value = 0), then the lower bound on the truth 
value of the consequent is only the universal lower bound zero, since mp(0, x) 
= 0 for any x This does not mean that the consequent is false, only that modus 
ponens places no restnctlons on the truth or falsehood of the consequent For 
truth values of the antecedent and the lmphcatlon between total truth and total 
falsehood, the lower bound for the truth of the consequent varies monotonically 
Modus tollens allows us to infer an upper bound for Tr(A), the truth value of 
the antecedent, from Tr(C) and Tr(A --* C) by computing the truth value of 
" ( I fA  then C) but not C , "  defining "but not" by the modus tollens generating 
function mt proper to the implication operator" 
Tr(A)_<mt[Tr(C), Tr(A ~ C)] 
where 
mt(y , / )=sup{x:  l(x, y)>_t} 
I f "Not"  Is defined by any strong negation such that Tr(Not A)  = n [Tr(A )] 
and Tr(A) = Tr(Not Not A),  then the above formulation is eqmvalent to 
deriving a lower bound for Tr(Not A)  given Tr(Not C) and TR(A --. C). For 
example, if the ubiquitous definltmn Tr(Not A)  = 1 - Tr(A) is used, then 
Tr(Not A)_  1 -rot[1 -Tr (Not  C), Tr(A ~ C)] 
Several researchers have recently discussed two additional modes of inference 
in multivalent logic that allow the computation of upper bounds on the truth 
value of the consequent and lower bounds on the truth value of the antecedent 
(Bandler and Kohout [3], Hall [4], Schwartz [5]). It is argued that these modes, 
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known as confirmatton and dental, are valid fuzzy or multivalent analog of the 
invalid classical fallacies of affirming the consequent and denying the 
antecedent, respectively In denial, the truth values of the implication and 
antecedent are used m a denial-generating function md to compute an upper 
bound for the truth value of the consequent: 
Tr (C)_md[Tr(A) ,  Tr(A ~ C)] 
where 
md(x, t )=sup{y:  I(x, y)<_t} 
In confirmaUon, the truth values of the consequent and the implication are used 
in a confirmation-generating funcuon mc to compute a lower bound for the truth 
value of the antecedent" 
Tr(A)<mc[Tr(C) ,  Tr(A --* C)] 
where 
mc(y, i )=mf{x:  I(x, y)-<i} 
It is very important to note, however, that confirmation and demal Deld no 
useful results unless the lmphcatlon is at least partially false; when " I f  A then 
C"  has a truth value of 1, denial assigns the trivial upper bound of 1 to the truth 
value of C and confirmation assigns the trivial lower bound of 0 to the truth 
value of A. 2 (See Hall [4] and Schwartz [5].) The deductwe power of both 
confirmatson and denial decreases monotomcally as the truth value of the 
lmphcatlon increases, m the sense that the bounds they impose on the consequent 
and the antecedent, respectively, become less restrlctwe the closer the 
implication comes to being strictly true. With respect o the other argument, 
confirmation most strongly constrains the antecedent when the truth value of the 
consequent is high, while demal most strongly constrains the consequent when 
the truth value of the antecedent is low. 
Gwen the existence of both an upper and a lower bound on the truth value of 
the consequent, we define augmented modus ponens as an interval-valued 
function whose result gives both an upper and lower bound on the truth value of 
the consequent as a joint funcuon of the truth values of the antecedent and of the 
lmphcatmn ~tself. 
mf{y : / f i r (A ) ,  y)>_Tr(A --* C)} <Tr(C)  
_<sup{y: I(Tr(A), y )<Tr (A  ~ C)} 
or, more concisely, 
mp[Tr(A), Tr(A ---, C)]<_Tr(C)<_md[Tr(A), Tr(A --* C)] 
2 This 18 the reason that confirmaUon a d demal allow no vahd references in classical logic 
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Modus tollens and confirmation can be unified into augmented modus tollens 
in an exactly slmtlar fashion 
mf{x: I[x, Tr(C)]_<Tr(A -~ C)} _<Tr(A) 
_<sup{x: I[x, Tr(C)]_>Tr(A ~ C)} 
or  
mc[Tr(C), Tr(A ---, C)] _< Tr(A ) < mt[Tr(C), Tr(A ---, C)] 
When Tr(A --* C) = 1, these intervals give no more mformauon than the 
tradmonal bounds provided by modus ponens and modus tollens. When TR(A 
C) is strictly less than 1, augmented modus ponens yields a unique value for 
Tr(C) in the logic systems based on the R-lmphcatlons R1 (Lukaslewlcz), R2 
(quotient), and R 3 (Brouwer) and m the logic systems based on the S- 
implications 11 (Lukaslewicz) and 12 (probabdlsuc), since the lower bound on 
Tr(C) given by mp(a, t ) is equal to the upper bound gwen by md(a, t ) for all t 
< 1 under these logics. The inferred interval for the S-lmphcaUon I3 (Kleene- 
Dlenes) also contains only a single point when Tr(A ~ C) < 1 except in the 
special case where Tr(A) and TR(A -o C) are equal. Simtlarly, augmented 
modus tollens yields a unique value for Tr(A) when TR(A ---, C) < 1 in the 
systems Rl, R2, Ii, and I2, since mc(y, t) = mt(y, t). For I3 the value is again 
umque except when Tr(A) = Tr(A --* C), whale for R3 augmented modus 
tollens always yields a nondegenerate interval of possible truth values of the 
antecedent A. 
The modes of confirmation and demal are closely related to two simpler 
modes, which we may call the mode of presumption and the mode ofprejudwe. 
In these inference modes, the truth value of the imphcauon alone places hmlts on 
the respective truth values of the antecedent and the consequent. According to 
the mode of prejudice, the truth value of the consequent is always less than or 
equal to the truth value of the lmphcaUon According to the mode of 
presumption, the truth of the antecedent is at least as great as a function of the 
truth value of the implication, the form of this funcUon varies depending on 
which lmphcatlon operator is used Tr(A) > 1 - Tr(A ~ C) under the logic 
systems/1 (Lukaslewicz),/2 (probabdlstlc), and/3 (Kleene-Dlenes), Tr(A) _> 
Tr(A ---, C) when Tr(A ~ C) < 1 under the logic system R3 (Brouwer'), and 
Tr(A) > 0 when Tr(A ~ C) < 1 under the logic system R2 (quotient). 
Presumption and preju&ce can be observed even m the classical system of 
two-valued logic. When the truth value of an implication is zero m two-valued 
logic, then "C  or Not A"  is a completely false statement This lmphes that 
"Not (C or Not A) "  is a completely true statement "Not (C or Not A) "  ~s 
eqmvalent to "A and Not C , "  so the crxsp denial of " I fA  then C"  ensures that 
A Is crisply true (presumption) and that C is crisply false (preJudice). On the 
other hand, when the truth value of the lmpllcatton is 1, the upper bound for C IS 
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1 and the lower bound for A Is 0, yielding no mformauon at all. In multwalent 
logic, when the truth value of the implication is neither zero nor one, 
presumption gwes a nontnvlal lower bound for the truth value of A and 
prejudice gives a nontrlvlal upper bound for the truth value of C 
In the case of the S-lmphcaUons, presumption and prejudice can be easily 
verified from the equivalence between " I fA  then C"  and "C  or Not A ,"  since 
Tr(C) < TR(C or Not A)  (preJudice), and the fact that Tr(Not A)  < Tr(C or 
Not A) lmphes that Tr(A) _> Tr[Not (C or Not A)] (presumpuon) 
In the case of R-lmphcatlons, prejudice follows directly from the fact that the 
modus ponens generating function of any R implication is a T-norm one of 
whose arguments i the truth value of the lmphcatlon, since the value computed 
from a T-norm can never exceed either of its arguments Presumption ts more 
difficult with R implications, and in some cases (such as the quotient logic R2) 
yields only the nearly trivial constraint that the truth value of the antecedent is 
strictly greater than zero when the truth value of the ~mpllcaUon ~s not equal to 
one 
For logic systems whose lmphcaUon operators are neither R-lmphcatlons nor 
S-lmphcatlons, uch as early Zadeh or quantum logic (Trlllas and Valverde [6]), 
It Is necessary to verify separately each of the six reference modes of modus 
ponens, modus tollens, confirmation, demal, presumption, and prejudice 
While demal reqmres mformat~on about both the truth of A and the truth of 
the lmphcat~on m order to specify the least upper bound on the truth of C, it 
often yields httle or no reformation about C that could not have been derived 
from the truth of the lmphcatlon alone using presumption Unless the truth of A 
Is close to the lower bound given by presumpUon, the upper bound for the truth 
of C gwen by demal Is not substanually different from that gwen by prejudice 
for most common lmphcatlon operators For Lukaslewlcz logic (11, R1), denial 
vanes hnearly with Tr(A); for quotient logic (R2), demal always vanes more 
slowly than Tr(A), for probabfllStlC logic (I2), denial varies more slowly than 
Tr(A ) when the latter is close to one but more rapidly when it is close to zero In 
the Brouwer logic system (R3) and the Kleene-Dlenes logic system (13), the 
bound gwen by demal is everywhere identical to the bound given by 
presumption Similarly, the lower bounds on the truth of A prowded by 
confirmation and by presumption are only shghtly different in many cases ano 
everywhere identical for R3 and 13 
Table 1 summarizes the six modes of reference for the logic systems temming 
from each of the five most ~mportant R and S ~mphcaUon operators 
The fact that the inference modes of presumption and prejudice are 
syntactically vahd leads to unfortunate consequences when mult~valent propos~- 
Uonal logic is used for knowledge-based systems Ordinarily when we give a 
truth value to an lmphcaUon rule, we want higher truth values to generate 
stronger rules and lower truth values to generate weaker ones. However, 
lowering the truth value of an lmphcatlon ile makes it more powerful with 
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resepct to presumption, prejudice, confirmation, and denial whale a makes the 
rule weaker with respect o modus ponens and modus tollens. Even worse, 
presumption means that implications with low truth values generally impose 
unwanted restrictions on the input data 
However, propositional logic is primarily concerned with absolute statements 
expressed as unique propositions, so perhaps it Is not surprising that a 
propositional knowledge base handles input data coming from an application 
environment poorly. Thus, we now turn our attention to predicate logic, which 
is currently the most widely used logic for knowledge-based systems 
PREDICATE LOGIC 
The basic form of an imphcation rule under predicate logic is " I f  X is A then 
Yls C,"  or " I fA (X)  then C(Y) "  for short. Xand Yare variables with their 
respective universes of discourse, and A and C are predicates that constrain the 
values of X and Y. The meaning is that if the predicate A is true of the quantity 
X, then the predicate C is also true of the quantity Y Our focus will be on 
implication rules for approximate reasoning in which A and C are fuzzy 
predicates that impose lastic onstraints on X and Y by restricting them to fuzzy 
subsets of their respective umverses of discourse. If the variable X takes on a 
particular crisp value x,, then the truth of the predicate A, Tr[(A (x,)], is equal to 
the membership grade of the x, in the fuzzy set corresponding toA, #A (x,), and 
slrmlarly for Y. Thus, for some values of X and Y the respective predicates A 
and C will have truth values Intermediate between 1 (' 'true") and 0 ("false") 
As in propositional logic, the truth value of " I f  A (X)  then C (Y ) "  increases 
monotonically with the truth value of C (Y)  and decreases monotonically with 
the truth value of A (X).  
Gwen any truth function I[Tr(A (X)) ,  Tr(C ( Y))] representing implication, 
It is easy to compute a fuzzy subset of the Cartesian product of the universes of 
discourse of X and Y, IxA-,c(X,, yj), based on the membership grades of each 
element x, in A and y: in C,/z.,l(x,) and I~c(Yj) 
ftA ~C(X1, Yj)  = I[bt A (XI), ftc(yj)]  
Regardless of which imphcation operator is used, some of the difficulties 
inherent in approximate reasoning with proposmonal logic recur in predicate 
logic when we try to interpret the meaning of the individual membership grade 
#A~c(X,, Yj) of an (X,, yj) pair In the Implication relation. Most fundamentally 
this membership grade IS the truth value of the implication " I f  x, belongs to the 
hypothetical value A, then yj belongs to the hypothetical value C " Interpreted 
as such, all of the modes of inference discussed for propositional logic are 
perfectly valid: #A-.c(X,, Yj) by itself gives a correct lower bound on #A(x,) 
through presumption and a correct upper bound on #c(Yj) through prejudice, 
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#A~c(X,, Y~) and #A (X,) together give correct bounds for gc(Yj) through modus 
ponens and demal; and #A-c(X,, Yj) and gc(Y~) together give correct bounds for 
#A (X,) through modus tollens and confirmation, where by "correct bounds" we 
simply mean that the actual truth value of the fuzzy predicate m question for any 
specific x, or yj is within the range specified by the inference. 
Although this interpretanon allows sound inference with respect to the 
hypothencal values A and C, such references are of httle or no practical benefit 
Apphed approximate reasoning reqmres that the knowledge contained m the 
lmpllcanon rules be applicable to data arising outside the system To do th~s, we 
take #A~c(X,, Yj) to be the truth value of the lmpllcanon "If X is x, then Y ~s 
Yj 
In the typical case, generahzed modus ponens ~s then performed using 
external data about the perceived value of X to make inferences about the 
unknown value of Y The inferred poss~blhty of each yj is found in two stages 
The first stage ~s to use each x,'s membership grade in the external datum "X  ~s 
A'"  as a truth value for the crisp proposmon "X  is x," in order to perform 
generalized modus ponens, yielding one lower bound for the truth of"  Y is y / '  
per base value m the X universe of discourse" 
Tr["Y=y/ '  IA --' C, Tr("X=x,")=#A,(X)]>-mp[#A,(X,), #A~c(X,, Yj)] 
The second stage is to combine these lower bounds into an overall truth value for 
"Y  is y j . "  This is generally done using the max operator $3, although it may be 
more appropriate o use the conorm proper to the logic system m use (when this 
system ~s not R3 or I3). Taken together, the truth values for each individual base 
value yj, reinterpreted as membership grades, determine C ' ,  the inferred 
predicate on the Y um,,erse of discourse 
However, this procedure leads to a paradox, because ff gA~c(X,, Yj) IS less 
than 1, presumpnon imposes a pnon restrictions on what truth values for "X  is 
x," may be asserted, while prejudice ~mposes a prior1 restrictions on what truth 
values for "Y  is y / '  may be referred. And these restrictions on truth values 
carry over into a pnon restrlcUons on membership grades in A '  and C ' ,  
respectively. In a mulnrule system, the presumptions and prejudices Imposed by 
the various rules may aggregate oform a "knowledge base psychos~s" mwhich 
no X value can be denied without wolatlng the presumpnon of some rule, and no 
Y value can be affirmed w~thout violating some rule's prejudice) 
Table 2 shows a simple example of knowledge base psychosis using the 
Lukas~ewicz system w~thjust two simple rules " I fX l s  above medmm then Yls 
high" and "If X is below medmm then Y is low." The prejudices of these two 
rules taken together deny all 11 base values of the Y variable. If the 
presumpnons of the two mdiv~dual rules are combined, they require the 
affirmation of nearly all base values of the X variable; furthermore, when 
presumpnon Is computed from the combined rule denved by the methods of 
Dubols and Prade [14, 151, it ~s necessary to affirm all the base values of X. 
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Formally, any set of axioms that asserts these two rules and also asserts any 
predicate other than "undefined" for Y or any predicate other than "unknown" 
for X is logically inconsistent 
For a multwalent logic system to be simultaneously useful and logically 
grounded, a way must be found to preserve modus ponens with respect o 
external data without simultaneously subjecting that data to presumption and 
prejudice One promising approach, which we now take up, is a return to the 
foundations of approximate r asoning, the theory of fuzzy subsets (Zadeh [16]) 
SET LOGIC 
In set logic, the concept of lmphcatlon is replaced with the more fundamental 
concept of set inclusion; the set logic relaUon corresponding to " I f  A then C"  is 
"All A 's  are C's ,"  or " I fp  is an .4 thenp is a C."  The latter representation is 
formally similar to the propositional implication " I fX  is A then Y is C"  except 
that both the antecedent and the consequent in the set logic form refer to a 
common universe of discourse Depending on the context, the elements of this 
universe may be referred to as objects, cases, possible worlds, or some term 
more specific to the apphcaUon. 
The correspondence b tween set logic and propositional logic can be further 
enhanced by using the obJect-attribute--value formahsm. If we define the set `4 
in " I fp  is an`4 thenp is a C"  as the set of object whose X attribute is in the set 
ofXvalues A and define the set C as the set of objects whose Y attribute is in the 
set of Y values C, then the antecedent and consequent of the set logic version 
express exactly the same information as the antecedent and consequent, 
respectively, of the propositional logic version discussed above. In this case, the 
rule takes the form " I f  Xp IS in ` 4 then Yp is m C,"  where Xp and Yp are the 
values of the two attributes X and Y for a single object p-- for example, the 
height and weight of a particular person 
Despite the eqmvalence mexpressive power between the two logical systems, 
the natural rules of reference differ strongly when the sets or equivalent 
propositions involved are fuzzy ones The most straightforward interpretation f
" I fp  is an `4 then p is a C"  IS that the membership grade of any object p in C is 
at least as great as its membership gr,~ 4.e in A" 
#A (P) < l~c(P) 
Definmg .4 and C as before m terms of attributes X and Y, we have 
#A (P) = ttA (Xp) and Izc(P) = I~c(YP) 
Then we can state the set inclusion, or lmphcatlon, relation In terms of these 
values: 
t~A(Xp)<_l~c(Yp) for all p 
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If we know the precise value of Xp, we can use modus ponens to make an 
inference about he value of Yp for the same object The first step is to find the 
degree to which Xp belongs to A; denote that membership grade as a Note that 
a IS also the membership grade of object p in A, and by the implication relation 
we can infer that the membership grade ofp  in C is greater than or equal to a; in 
other words, p is an element of the a-cut Ca, defined as the set of objects whose 
membership n C is _~< a. This In turn is equivalent to saying that p 's  value on 
attribute Y, Yp, belongs to the a-cut Ca, the set of Y values that belong to C at 
least to degree a. Since a IS here a crisp value, Ca is a crisp subset of the Y 
universe of discourse. In many apphcatlons A and C will be convex fuzzy sets, 
so a crisp value for Xp causes us to infer a crisp interval of values for Yp 
If the value of Xp is given as a fuzzy subset A '  of the universe of X values, 
the principle is the same although the procedure is more complicated /~A (Xp) 
becomes #A (A' ) ,  the degree to which the fuzzy set A '  belongs to the fuzzy set 
A. This membership grade is a fuzzy subset of the universe of ordinary 
membership grades, given by the following formula 
IXA( A ') = ~ I~A ,(X) 
"7  A(X) 
This IS also the membership grade of the object p in the fuzzy set of objects A 
I.tA(p) = "~. tLA t(x) 
"7 
which by the implication rule gives a fuzzy lower bound on the grade of 
membership of p In C: 
#c(p)> ~ #At(X)p~4(X) 
and hence a fuzzy lower bound on the grade of membership of Yp In the fuzzy 
subset C of the universe of Y values 
~c(yp)> ~ x #A'(X)I~A(X) 
Taking Into account he fact that two or more x values In the X universe of 
discourse may have the same membership grade in A, we can rewrite this as 
#c(yp)> ~ SUpx{~A'(X): #A(X)=a} 
Ol ot 
Each element a of this fuzzy set of membership grades corresponds toan a-cut 
Ca = {y: #c(Y) -> a } derived from the fuzzy set C given in the rule. Using the 
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resolution identity of fuzzy mathematics (Zadeh [17, 18]), we can combine these 
a-cuts according to the membership grades of their corresponding a values to 
form the fuzzy set C ' ,  which is our best inference of the value of Yp: 
C'  =L J  SUpx{~A ,(x): /zA (x) = a}C~ 
a 
C'  is thus the fuzzy set defined by the fuzzy set of a-cuts of C, m other words, 
by an a-cut of C for which a is itself a fuzzy set of membership grades 
In the case of a crisp data value for Xp, Xp = x ,  it is easy to show that this 
version of modus ponens in fuzzy set logic is equivalent to the use of the standard 
strict lmphcation operator in fuzzy propostmnal modus ponens; m both cases, 
the grade of membership of a particular Ys m C'  is 1 if #A(x,) -< /~c(Yj) and 0 
otherwise. The two versions of modus ponens are also equivalent in the case of 
fuzzy data, the proof, which is omitted here, centers on expressing the inferred 
C '  of propositmnal modus ponens in terms of its a-cuts using the resolution 
principle 
Despite this equivalence, the problems posed by the modes of presumptmn 
and prejudice do not arise If  a particular (x,, yj) pair has a membership grade of 
zero in the fuzzy set implication (inclusion) relation, this asserts only that there 
exists no p such that Xp = x, and Yp = yj. Without additional informatmn 
about Yp this leaves Xp unconstrained, and without information about Xp, Yp 
is similarly unconstrained The fact that the equivalent operation to modus 
ponens results in a specific fuzzy set of possible values of Yp rather than a lower 
bound on memberships m this set makes consideratmn of denial unnecessary 
Fuzzy set logic obeys the law of contrapositive symmetry (A - ,  C is 
equivalent to Not C --, Not A) since IZA(P) <-- #c(P) lmplies that/£NotC(P) ~-~ 
/ZNotA (P) Because of this, all of the results given above for modus ponens (and 
for prejudice and denial) are also true, mutatls mutandzs, for modus tollens 
(and for presumption and confirmation) 
To summarize, fuzzy set logic succeeds in preserving enerallzatmn of the 
classically valid forms modus ponens and modus tollens, while eliminating the 
aberrant forms confirmatmn, denial, presumption, and prejudice. But by 
mandating the standard strict implication operator, it incurs the cost of requiring 
a degree of crispness in fuzzy implication that, whale convement for some 
applications, Is quite inappropriate in others. 
EXAMPLE: FAST DRIVING IMPLIES POOR FUEL ECONOMY 
Propositional Logic 
Implication in propositional logic connects two unanalyzed sentences or 
proposlUons. Suppose we have the two propositions "You drive fast" or "Your 
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fuel economy Is poor" and the imphcatlon " I f  you drive fast then your fuel 
economy is poor." If we take the lmphcatlon to be completely true, this tells us 
nothing a priori about he lndwldual truth values of "You drive fast" and "Your 
fuel economy is poor"; but, gwen any specific truth value x for "You drive 
fast," modus ponens guarantees that the truth value of "Your fuel economy is 
poor" is between x and 1, regardless of the logic system. 
However, suppose we attempt to express reservations about he ~mphcatlon by 
assigning a reduced truth value, such as .7, to the rule " I f  you drive fast then 
your fuel economy is poor." Now, for any of the R and S implicauons 
discussed, prejudice demands that the truth value of "your fuel economy is 
poor" must not exceed .7, while presumption demands that the truth value of 
"You drive fast" must be greater than or equal to .3 (Rl, $2, or $3), greater than 
or equal to .7 (R3), or smctly greater than zero (R2). Gwen a truth value for 
"You drive fast" that satisfies presumption, we can use augmented modus 
ponens to gain reformation about the truth value of "Your fuel economy is 
poor." For example, if the truth value of "You drive fast" is 8, then the truth 
value of "your fuel economy is 
.7 - (1 - .8) 
(.7)(.8) 
.5/.8 
and 
poor" is 
= .5 according to Ri 
= .56 according to R2 
= .625 according to $2 
= .8 according to R3 or $3 
All of these values are precise, m the sense that the lower bound provided by 
regular modus ponens is equal to the upper bound provided by denial No other 
truth values for "Your fuel economy is poor" are compatible with a truth value 
of .8 for "You drive fast" and a truth value of .7 for " I f  you drive fast then your 
fuel economy is poor" within the respective logic systems. 
Predicate Logic 
Fuzzy pre&cate logic allows us to express the concept of a fast speed as a 
fuzzy predicate defined over the base variable speed measured in miles per hour 
(mph) The fuzzy predicate "Fast"  Is reduced by a fuzzy subset of speeds as 
shown in Figure 1 A crisp predicate has the value true (1.0) for some elements 
of its universe of discourse and false (zero) for others. By extension, a fuzzy 
predicate has a truth value m the range from zero to one for each element of ~ts 
universe; thus, for example, the predicate "Fast"  has the truth value of .8 when 
the speed is 60 mph. The fuzzy predicate "Poor ,"  whose umverse of discourse 
IS fuel economy measured in males per gallon (mpg), IS slrmlarly induced by the 
fuzzy set shown m Figure 2. For example, the fuzzy predicate "Poor"  has a 
truth value of .8 when fuel economy is 19 mpg. 
The ~mphcat~on " I f  speed is fast then fuel economy is poor" is also a fuzzy 
predicate, whose domain of definition ~s the Cartesian product of mph and mpg. 
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Table 3. Truth Values of the Implication Predicate 
0 0 
10 0 
20 0 
It IO 0 
p 40 0 
h 50 0 
60 0.B0 
70 0.94 
80 0.97 
900.98 
I00 0.99 
0 0 
10 0 
2O 0 
It 30 0 
p 40 0 
h 50 0 
60 0.80 
70 0 94 
80 0.97 
90 0.99 
100 0.99 
0 0 
10 0 
20 0 
R 30 0 
p 40 0 
h 50 0 
60 0.80 
70 0.94 
BO 0.97 
900 98 
100 0 99 
Lukaszemtcz: 51,81 
Npg 
0 5 tO 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 
1 1 1 1 .75 50.25 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 95 .70 .45  ,20 .2O 20,2O 
1 1 .81 .56 31 06 .06 ,06 .0 /~ 
1 1 78 .52~.28 .03  03.03.03 
1 1 77.52 27 .02.02 02 02 
1 1 .76 .51  26 .01  .01 .01 01 
Prob~t lss tzc :  $2 
HP9 
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 
i 1 l .75 30 .25  0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1  1 1 1  
1 1 1 1  1 1 1  
1 1 1 1  1 1 1  
1 1 1 1  1 1 1  
1 1 1 1  1 1 1  
1 1 1 1  1 1 1  
1 .80.60 40.20.20 20 20 
1 .76 .53 .29 .06 .06 .06 06 
1 .76 51 27 .03 .03 .03 .03 
1 .75 .51 .26 .02 .02 02 02 
1 .75 50 26 01 .01 .01 .01 
0 0 
10 0 
20 0 
PiIO 0 
p40 0 
h50 0 
60 0.80 
70 0.94 
BO 0.97 
90 0.98 
lO0 0 99 
0 5 
I I 
guotzent: R2 
ffpg 
10 15 20 25 ~0 35 40 45 
1 1 ,75.50.25 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 l l l l l 
1 1 1 1 t l t 
1 1 t 1 1 1 l 
1 1 l 1 1 1 1 
l l 1 1 1 1 1 
l 1 l ,94 .63 ,~l 0 
l l l .80 .~.27  0 
l l 1 77 51 .26 0 
L L l .7 I, .51 .25 0 
l I I 76 51 ,25 0 
Kleen-Osens: $3 
npo 
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 
1 1 1 75 .50 ,25 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
I 1 1 1 1 1 1 ! 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 I 1 1 l 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 .75 50 25 .20 .20 .20 .20 
I l 1 .75 50 25 .06.06 .06 .06 
1 1 1 75 .50 .25 .03 .03 .03 03 
1 1 I .75 .50.25.02.02 02.02 
1 l 1 75 50.25.01 .01 O1.0I 
0 5 
1 1 
0 0 1 1 
10 0 t I 
20 0 I 1 
HI0 0 1 1 
p40 0 1 1 
h50 0 1 I 
600 80 1 1 
70094 1 1 
80 0.97 1 1 
90 0.98 1 1 
100 0.99 1 1 
Dronuer: R3 
ffPg 
10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 GO 
l I ,75 ,50 .25 0 0 0 0 
L 1 1 1  11  
1 I l l  I L  
1 1 1 1  I t  
1 1 1 1  I t  
1 l i t  L I  
1 1 1 1  11  
1 75 .~25 00  
I .~ .~.~ 0 0 0  
1 75~25 0 0 0  
1 .75 .~.25  0 0 0 
! .75 .~.25  0 0 0 
A fuzzy knowledge base often IS expressed as a collecuon of arrays, where each 
array corresponds to an nmphcation formed by two fuzzy predicates, and each 
entry in an array gives the truth value of that lmphcauon for the corresponding 
pair of elements of the respective umverses of discourse. (It ~s possible to assert 
that an lmphcauon is only partly true, as we did m the case of predicate lognc, 
but the result zs equivalent to another zmphcatzon with a modzfied consequent 
that is completely true, so no generahty is gamed.) 
Suppose that " I f  speed is fast then fuel economy Is poor" zs one such 
imphcatlon. Table 3 shows the truth values of the lmphcatzon predicate at 
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0 
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75 
selected (x,, ys) pairs, where x, is a particular ate of speed measured in miles 
per hour and Ys zs a particular level of fuel economy measured in males per 
gallon, for each of the five logics discussed above Table 4 shows the lower 
bounds on the truth of the speed component of the pair, defined by the lowest 
antecedent truth value of x, that could generate the given truth value of the 
lmphcation within the logic in question (presumption). The greatest lower bound 
m each row gives the overall presumption derived from the rule, a logical 
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inconsistency occurs if a predicate of speed is asserted that assigns any partacular 
rate of speed a membership grade less than the membership grade assigned to it 
by presumption. An example of such a predicate is the datum "You drive very 
fast." Table 5 shows a sirmlar analysis for prejudice; the least upper bound for 
each column gwes the overall prejuchce. 
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Figure 3. "Fast" Speeds and "Very Fast" Speeds 
Set Logic 
Consider the statement "People who drive fast have poor fuel economy," 
which asserts that each person belongs to the fuzzy set of people with poor fuel 
economy at least as much as he or she belongs to the fuzzy set of people who 
drive fast. To understand this relation, consider the fuzzy set of "fast" speeds 
and the fuzzy set of "poor"  fuel economies shown m Figures 1 and 2 Suppose 
we want to deduce the fuel economy of a person whose dnvmg speed is 60 mph. 
Figure 1 displays a cusp value for a speed of 60 mph superimposed upon the 
membership function of "fast" m the speed universe of discourse. Persons 
whose speed is 60 belong with degree 0.8 to the set of people who drive fast, 
since this is the degree of membership of their speed in the set of "fast" speeds 
Ftgure 2 portrays the membership function of "poor"  m the fuel economy 
umverse of discourse. The persons in the set whose fuel econormes are at least 
0 8 compatible with "poor"  are shown m Figure 2 to have fuel economies mthe 
crisp interval [0, 19] mpg Thus, we refer that no one who habaually drives 60 
mph has a fuel economy better than 19 mpg. 
Now suppose that the datum regardmg person P's driving habits is "Person P 
drives very fast." Figure 3 graphs the membership functions of "fast" (the 
antecedent) and "very fast" (the datum). For any pamcular speed, say 60 mph, 
we can find a membership grade m person P's speed, m th|s case 0.64, and a 
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"Poor" Fuel Econormes and "Very Poor" Fuel Economies 
generally different membership grade in the antecedent, m this case 0 8 From 
this information, which pertains only to 60 mph, we can derive one level set of 
the fuzzy set of mpg ratings that makes up person P's inferred fuel economy. 
We begin by finding the level set of the consequent "poor"  corresponding to
0.8, the membership grade of 60 mph in the antecedent "fast."  This level set is 
the interval from 0 to 19 mpg If 60 mph were perfectly compaUble with person 
P's driving, as it was in the previous example, this interval would be perfectly 
compatible with person P's fuel economy. However, since we now assume that 
person P's driving is not " fast"  but "very fast," 60 mph is only 0.64 
compatible with person P's driving, so we infer that the corresponding 0 8 level 
set of the consequent "poor"  is only 0 64 compatible with person P's fuel 
economy 
Thus, the upper horizontal line in Figure 4 representing the 0 8 level set of the 
consequent "poor"  is moved down to a membership grade of 0.64; the lower 
horizontal line represents the 0.64 level set in the inferred fuel economy for 
person P. 
We repeat his process for all possible miles per hour speeds. That is, we find 
the level set of "poor"  corresponding to the membership grade of each 
particular speed x, mph in the antecedent "fast,"  and assign this level set a 
membership n P's inferred fuel economy equal to the membership grade of the 
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speed x, in the datum "P  drives very fast." These level sets, defined in the fuel 
economy (mpg) universe of discourse, collectively trace out the lower curve in 
Figure 4. Generating the inferred fuel economy by applying the datum "P  drives 
very fast" to the rule "People who drive fast have poor fuel economy" thus 
allows us to infer that P has very poor fuel economy. 
CONCLUSION 
Confirmation and denial are two recently introduced modes of inference in 
fuzzy logic (Bandler and Kohout [3], Hall [4], Schwartz [5]). We have examined 
these modes together with the standard modes of modus ponens and modus 
tollens in the contexts of propositional logic and predicate logic and have derived 
the closely related inference modes of presumption and prejudice. In the 
process, we have uncovered some fundamental difficulties in how fuzzy 
implication is to be interpreted in a fuzzy expert system given the a priori 
restrictions placed on the model of the application by presumption and prejudice, 
and to a lesser extent by confirmation and denial. 
One way of escaping these problems is to use a logic based on fuzzy sets 
rather than on multlvalent truth values, as discussed in the section on set logic 
The pnncipal drawback of this approach is some loss of expressive flexibility, in 
effect, the system of fuzzy set logic described here limits the choice of 
implication operator to a single, rather nonfuzzy choice, the "standard strict" 
implication operator. In future research, we Intend to relax this restriction 
somewhat through the use of aspects of Zadeh's concept of "usuahty" [19] 
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